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INTRODUCTION
THE DECADE OF THE 1980s was the heyday ofthe Golden Ten game in the Netherlands.
At that time there were more than 100 casinos
in the country that exploited Golden Ten; many
were small casinos with no more than one or
two playing tables but a number were larger
gaming places that could measure up to the
three state casinos in Zandvoort (1976), Valken-
burg (1977) and Scheveningen (1979). Mostly
the Golden Ten casinos were tolerated but they
were often controversial as well. Not only were
some of the casinos suspect of fraud and asso-
ciated with criminality, but they also had an
unclear legal status. The uncertainty lay therein
if Golden Ten was to be considered a game of
skill, as the operators claimed it was, or rather
a gaming game, as, among others, the Dutch
Casino Counsel marked it.
In the early nineties all uncertainty was
ended, and consequently Golden Ten bloomed.
In 1991 the Supreme Court finally decided that
Golden Ten is indeed a game of chance and that
exploitation is therefore illegal according to the
Dutch Gaming Act. Since this decision the
Golden Ten casinos have been leading a mar-
ginal existence. On the other hand, the Dutch
state casinos, known as Holland Casino since
1989, has expanded and extended considerably
in the late eighties and early nineties. Its num-
ber went up from 3 to 10 between 1985 and 1995
and profits rose from 142 to 665 million
guilders. This way, the rise of the legal casino
industry seems to present a classic example of
a market of “vices” that enter the business il-
legally, are then tolerated and eventually le-
galized, a developmental logic that, generally
speaking, seems to revolve around alcohol,
drugs, and prostitution as well.1
A GAMING COMPLEX
With this article I would like to argue that
this logic should rather be the result than the
starting point of the analysis. Indeed, at the
start there was no set assumption that the
Golden Ten casinos were illegal or criminal.
Furthermore, it is not self-evident that the gov-
ernment itself exploits the casino market. It
would have been possible to legalize just some
private Golden Ten casinos. It would not be the
first time as the government did apply differ-
ent, if not opposing, strategies to other gaming
markets. In 1986 the legislature legalized the
up-to-then condoned market of slot machines,
while the commercial exploitation of bingo has
always been and still is illegal. The dynamics
of legislation of gaming markets are hard to
fathom without a closer examination of the ac-
tors that render a market legal or illegal. In this
case, criminality and illegality are considered
social constructions, where at times bona fide
and legal is merely the outcome of negotiations
and dispute between diverging parties linking
specific definitions of what they feel is admis-
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sible to their power relations.2 In this light, it
does not per se interest me if a gaming market
is legal or not. I would like to focus on the pro-
cesses of market development and market con-
trol, processes that run different courses and
have different outcomes for various gaming
markets. Subsequently, I will not beforehand
regard certain games as legal or illegal, as it is
precisely this distinction that needs explana-
tion. The Golden Ten issue is also essential to
understand the construction of the legal casino
industry. The game will cease to be merely an
anecdote or footnote in the history of the Dutch
casino market as it is often made to be. In short,
this article will be about the dynamics of (il)le-
galization and the contribution of the Golden
Ten game to the Dutch gaming industry.
The dynamics of (il)legalization of Golden
Ten take shape in the context of a specific
regime of regulation for gaming. In The Gam-
ing Complex,3 from which much of this article
is derived, I have described this regime in terms
of the “alibi model” as the basis of the Dutch
Gaming Act of 1964. Under this regime gam-
ing is considered to be morally controversial,
the exploitation of gaming is restricted as pri-
vate pursuit of profit is countered by linking
gaming practices to “the public interest” and
“good causes,” and gaming can become legal
to sidestep illegal markets. This regime indeed
advances legal gaming but at the same time il-
legality is just as much a condition as a conse-
quence of the (restricted) market. The alibi
model can be read as a transitional stage be-
tween regulation based on prohibitions on the
one hand and regulation based on exploitation
risks on the other. The end of the Golden Ten
era marks in my view the transition to a new
regulation regime for gaming, which I refer to
as the “risk model.”4 This new regime (legally)
accepts the exploitation of gaming, it also ac-
knowledges the economical importance of the
gaming industry, and regulates gaming pri-
marily to contain “external effects” of addiction
and criminality. This way, illegal markets are
primarily counteracted by the public prosecu-
tor and represent less reason to create legal al-
ternatives.
To stay true to the idea of a transitional stage
I will describe Golden Ten in terms of “limi-
nality” as it was introduced by the anthropol-
ogist Victor Turner in The Ritual Process.5 He
defined “liminal entities” as “neither here nor
there; they are betwixt and between the posi-
tions assigned and arrayed by law, custom,
convention and ceremonial.”6 The notion of
liminality allows us to investigate a situation
that is neither legal nor illegal but is indicative
of some kind of double identity somewhere be-
tween the two. A liminal zone offers socially
accepted opportunities to explore boundaries
and experiment with new behavioral and or-
ganizational forms. Golden Ten was leaving
criminality behind and anticipating a legal
statutory status.
GOLDEN TEN
The Golden Ten exploitation strategy is
based on the evasion of the Gaming Act by 
appealing to the skills the game requires. The
strategy is probably as old as the notion of
chance in gaming law. After all, illegality is
foremost the logical complement of legal stan-
dards. Every legal criterion elicits its specific
charades. It is not just the issue of chance but
also, for example, the criteria of public accessi-
bility and (the prohibition of) commercial ex-
ploitation, that can be dodged by calling on re-
spectively “privacy” and “voluntariness” and
the “good cause.” The evasive strategy of skill,
for that matter, can not only be found in the
field of roulette but it can also come with e.g.,
slot machines, lotteries, and bingo.
The roulette game of skill, also referred to as
pseudo roulette or quasi roulette, appears in
different forms during the course of time, fea-
turing names as Delphi, Saturne, Roulex, and
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Derby. The Golden Ten game, or 24 Observa-
tion roulette, was designed by the West Ger-
man Jürgen Blattgerste and first introduced in
1979 in a hotel in Antwerp. At least, this is how
the journalist Leon Zoeteman7 reconstructs the
origin of the game.
The question of the origin of these games,
however, is far less interesting than that of the
circumstances that give ground to the evasion
strategy of skill and the consequences thereof
for the organization of gaming. As early as at
the beginning of the twentieth century the Jeu
de poule, for example, was reason enough for a
small but important addition to the law on lot-
teries, making it easier to keep off games of
skill. The criterion of “no influence” by partic-
ipants on the determination of chance no longer
sufficed for the 1905 law on lotteries, the legis-
lature sharpened the notion to “no paramount
influence.”
The roulette game of skill besets the legal
casino industry not only in space but also sur-
rounds it in time. During the depression of the
1930s A.A. Zijlstra, the tourist director of the sea-
side resort Scheveningen (near The Hague) in-
troduced a roulette game of skill in the Kurhaus
hotel, an initiative that was soon followed on
various other locations in the Netherlands.8
However, this type of roulette was soon forbid-
den by law and Zijlstra later made sure to seize
every possible opportunity to promote legal
casinos in the Netherlands. Some decades later,
in the seventies, he was closely involved with
the planning of the first legal Dutch casinos.
When in the sixties several forms of the
roulette games of skill appeared once more
with justice taking action against them, the
High Court released a specification of the statu-
tory regulations of chance, in the decree on the
game of Saturne.9 To determine whether the
participants can influence the outcome of the
game “the actual results of the large majority
of the players of the game are decisive.” Thus,
the concept of chance depends on the subjec-
tive experience and personal behavior of the
players—according to the judge they refrain
from calculating their chances as they are
“mentally lazy” or find the game “more amus-
ing” this way—and not on the objective struc-
ture of the game, built in by the organizer. This
was actually where the seed was sown for the
Golden Ten issues in the 1980s. The public
prosecutor has faced a very difficult task try-
ing to prove that the participants have no in-
fluence on the outcome of the game. Until 1991,
when the High Court accepted a scientific re-
port by the two cognitive psychologists W. Wa-
genaar and G. Keren10 as proof of the chance
factor of Golden Ten, the juridical controversy
around the argumentation was Golden Ten’s
raison d’être.
Although juridical and mathematical discus-
sions about the issue of chance do not imme-
diately strike us as sociological subjects, these
arguments are pre-eminently a social phenom-
enon and highly relevant to the structure of the
gaming complex. That is, if we choose not to
treat these controversies as mathematical and
juridical issues and, as the anthropologist Bruno
Latour does with techno-science in Science in
Action,11 concentrate on the social strategies be-
hind the arguments and the social conse-
quences that follow.
The controversy over the chance element of
Golden Ten has far-reaching consequences. In
a judicial translation in 1983 of a complicated
mathematical analysis of a number of seem-
ingly futile details of the game, a Golden Ten
operator was acquitted. Consequently, Golden
Ten casinos shot up like mushrooms all over
the country. Throughout the eighties this
greatly affected the entire casino industry in the
Netherlands, as it also touched on the state casi-
nos. However, the rise of Golden Ten in the
Netherlands cannot be explained by the ju-
risprudence and the liberal attitude of justice
alone. The roulette game of skill did not have
its real breakthrough before the eighties, due
to various additional circumstances. For one
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thing, in 1970 there was the foreboding of the
legalization of casinos upon which the advo-
cates of legal casinos seized to explore the strat-
egy of skill as it was tried out in the sixties.
Also, as police and justice spent only little time
and effort on them during these years, the op-
erators of illegal casinos could ease up on the
regulations of the Gaming Act. This changed in
the 1980s when justice introduced a stricter en-
forcement of the Gaming Act. This intensifica-
tion became most tangible in the case against
the year-long condoned casinos of Maurits de
Vries in the Amsterdam red light district and
Ger Van Driel Vis in the Rotterdam harbor
area.12 As long as they can “take it easy,” crim-
inals will not go “the hard way.”
In 1981 Gerard Wiggers, an associate of
Blattgerste, introduced Golden Ten in the
Netherlands, first in Enschede, then in Berg en
Dal. At the start of 1983 the public prosecutor
took action against the Enschede casino and
launched a test case against Golden Ten. The
public prosecutor lost this showdown all the
way to the High Court.13 The judge ruled that
there was no conclusive evidence that Golden
Ten was a game of chance. In his defense Wig-
gers referred to a scientific report that was com-
missioned by another associate of Blattgerste.14
This report stated that “the chance of success
for players is higher with Golden Ten than with
an absolute game of chance.” During the ap-
peal the public prosecutor called in Prof. W.
Wagenaar. However, Wagenaar at that time
declared that he could not pronounce on the
chance factor of Golden Ten because of the
vagueness of the legal criterion.
SKILL
Of national importance for the history of
Golden Ten is the picturesque village Berg en
Dal with a touristy reputation, near the city of
Nijmegen in the east of the Netherlands. It was
here that the police demonstrated for the first
time that the players of Golden Ten in fact play
the game as they would a game of chance. This
affair succinctly, and rather absurdly, exposed
the narrow link between the production of
knowledge and the implementation of policies.
However, as mentioned before, the attempts by
the police and justice department to determine
the chance factor of the game are sociologically
relevant because it is this factor that stipulates
whether casinos are or are not legal. Thus, in
order to grasp its social dynamics we need to
learn not only who are involved in the game
and its operation but also how the game is
played, what technique is used.
In July 1983 the respectable yet destitute Ho-
tel Hamer in Berg en Dal provided the facility
to play Golden Ten.15 The owner let out the
large room of the hotel to the charity organi-
zation Casino Club Berg en Dal, founded by J.
Blattgerste, R. Schneider, and G. Wiggers; the
last mentioned being the chairman. Here they
exploited three Golden Ten kettles with seven
playing tables. The founding of the casino club
was thoroughly prepared. The operators took
their advice from a solicitor and conferred with
the mayor and police department of the mu-
nicipality. After consulting the public prosecu-
tor of the provincial capital (Arnhem) the mu-
nicipality assumed a neutral position and the
police was not to act against the casino. Two
years earlier, in July 1981, the same operators
introduced Golden Ten in the Netherlands in
the Derby Club casino in Enschede, where
again Wiggers was chairman. The public pros-
ecutor, as mentioned, prosecuted Wiggers but
in May 1983 he was cleared by the court. This
acquittal provoked Wiggers to exploit Golden
Ten once more, this time in Berg en Dal.
The acquittal and the opening of Casino Club
Berg en Dal lead to the establishment of vari-
ous casinos like the one in Berg en Dal all over
the Netherlands. In and around Nijmegen sev-
eral operators tried their luck. As a response to
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this fast expansion the public prosecutor of the
county court district decided to prosecute the
Golden Ten game. This decision was put in a
letter to the operator and hotel owner of Casino
Club Berg en Dal in late September and they
closed the club. However, when the court of
Arnhem confirmed the earlier acquittal of Wig-
gers in a higher court the operators saw this as
a reinforcement of the legal position of the
Golden Ten game. At the end of November
they introduced a new Casino Club in Hotel
Hamer. The former operators, however, stepped
back and the “new” casino club was appointed
a different chairman as the public prosecutor
had already indicated not to let it rest easily.
The new club also suggested that the psycho-
logical expert Prof. W. Wagenaar investigate
the skill factor of Golden Ten; in a suit the op-
erators requested permission to keep the club
open for such a study. Nonetheless, in early De-
cember the public prosecutor made it clear that
the casino would have to close down. Right up
to the verdict on December 20th, wherein the
judge dismissed the operators’ demand, the
casino stayed in business. On that day the pub-
lic prosecutor searched Hotel Hamer and took
possession of the attributes of the game.
During the criminal investigation that pre-
ceded the closure, the police, on its own initia-
tive, conducted an investigation into the skill
involved with Golden Ten. In the summons the
sergeant major of the state police described the
game accurately.16 The element that most dif-
fers from traditional French roulette is that with
Golden Ten the numeric circle is fixed and does
not turn. The ball rolls in a continuous circle on
the wide rim of an aluminium dish around the
numeric wheel. In the process of slowing down,
the ball approaches the circle only reaching it
after numerous rotations. While rotating and
moving towards the centre of the dish the ball
passes two rings that are marked on the dish.
The first ring the ball crosses shortly after it is
thrown, is the “observation ring,” the second
ring near the numeric circle in the heart of the
dish is the “limit ring.” From the exact spot
where the ball crosses the “observation ring” it
is supposedly possible to deduce where the ball
will end up on the numeric circle. When the
ball passes the “limit ring” it is so close to the
numeric circle that the players may no longer
place any bets. The orbit of the ball is not per-
fectly round, it is somewhat elliptic. Next to this
important technical difference, another big dif-
ference is that traditional roulette is played
with 36 instead of 24 numbers—many roulette
games of skill are therefore referred to as “24-
roulette.” This increases the bank’s advantage.
The advantage of the Golden Ten bank is
greater also because the game has two nils in-
stead of one, which is also true for American
roulette. The wages with Golden Ten, on the
other hand, can be rather low; often the mini-
mal wager is f 2,50, sometimes only f 1,-. Hotel
Hamer started out with a minimal wager of f 5,-
which eventually dropped to f 2,50.
Do the players actually use any skills? That
is what the sergeant major of the state police
wanted to know. From his own observations
he did not get the impression that they do.
Many players seem to prefer the numbers that
are within reach, and the players at the far end
of the table can hardly see the observation ring
on the disc. The club rules stated that, in order
to encourage the use of skill, every player has
to observe at least five rounds of the game be-
fore they may join in. These observation rounds
are to be respected with every change of table.
However, the police found there was hardly
any supervision on the observation of this par-
ticular rule. Furthermore, the bouleur warns
the players to use their skills by calling “Watch
please!” just before the ball crosses the obser-
vation ring. There is no betting before these
words are said.
As part of a more structured police investi-
gation the police officers observed the game
transactions for a total time of four days, with
some intermissions. A croupier who was there
at the time remembers the following, in 1993:
We were open to the public as usual and
the officers stood around the table to ob-
serve whether the players were observing
the game. This went on for about two
weeks. We would play very officially
while they were there. After they had left
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we would say “guys, back to your normal
bets now.” Most players really didn’t look
at the ball. It would be like “my daughter
was born on the fifth so I will bet number
five.” This was actually not permitted. We
were supposed to address these players,
saying “no ma’am, you have to look first.”
She would then say “I’m really not look-
ing, you know that as well as I do,” while
the police were right there. The officers
would just laugh with us.17
Each round the officers put down whether
the players “look” at the dish and the ball or
not, whether they “deliberately” choose the
numbers they bet on and how often they “win,”
on pre-printed forms. The officers monitored
the games of 245 players, with no more than
three going on simultaneously. The police con-
cluded that the players must have been “gam-
ing” in 89.3 percent of the 3487 games that were
observed.
In the line of these observations the police
summoned several members of the Board and
staff of the new Casino Club Berg en Dal. One
of the statements revealed that the club had
around 1600 “members” and 30 staff members.
The chairwoman of the club and the manager,
at the insistence of the police—who obviously
wished to enhance the validity of their obser-
vations—declared that the monitoring officers
did not in any way influence the members’
usual playing behavior. The police questioned
Schneider as the letter of the game material.
The total worth of the material inside the casino
club was said to be around 100.000 Dutch
guilders. One of the things he stated was that
Blattgerste and his patent on Golden Ten in the
Netherlands was not very strong; by introduc-
ing just minor changes anyone could exploit
the game without a possible intervention from
their side. The police examined the landlord
Hamer, who let out the club’s location for 7500
Dutch guilders a month. Hamer declared that
he did everything to avoid any “conflicts with
the law.” Indeed the lease mentioned that the
game must be legal.
The semi-scientific police investigation may
have been dubious but that is not the point
here. Important is that the judge accepted the
argument and sentenced the chairman of the
new Casino Club Berg en Dal, a sentence which
was later on upheld by the High Court. How-
ever, this did not put an end to Golden Ten.
The public prosecutor prosecuted a few Golden
Ten casinos but the judges only decided in the
prosecutor’s favor if the chance factor of the
game was made evident through an elaborate
police investigation as was executed at Hotel
Hamer. This heavy onus of proof, requiring a
fresh observation investigation for every clo-
sure, was beyond many police forces and the
public prosecutor; the police estimated that the
investigation at the new Casino Club Berg en
Dal took up around 1400 man-hours. The offi-
cers involved in the investigation were even-
tually frustrated over the meager result after
such a great deal of effort. As a result of the lit-
tle success up to the nineties, the public prose-
cutor in the district of Arnhem took the posi-
tion that national regulations should be
formulated before prosecuting Golden Ten
once more. In 1984 the Attorney General de-
cided to provisionally stop prosecuting Golden
Ten in the whole of the Netherlands.
POLICY
As Golden Ten casinos can appeal to their le-
gal status they can also manifest themselves as
such. The casinos appear on eye-catching loca-
tions and advertise openly. The game is also 
referred to as “peoples roulette.” Publicity is
aimed at a large local and regional public. Com-
pared to the state casinos there is relatively low
betting and high accessibility. There is no
dress-code, the croupier does not expect a tip,
manners are informal, and all is easy going.
Staying at the Golden Ten casino is sweetened
by free drinks and snacks, cab-money or a
‘katje’ (a small amount of money if you hap-
pen to lose all of your own), and at times spec-
tacular extra bonuses and celebrity shows.
Through their accessible local and regional
nearness and by aiming for the big public,
Golden Ten furthers the democratization and
social legitimacy of casinos. In other words,
Golden Ten lifts the casino out of the under-
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ground sphere of illegality but at the same time
out of the elite and tourist minded scheme of
state casinos.
Still the world of the Golden Ten casinos has
been everything but uniform. Golden Ten has
spread out over the entire range of casinos,
from the private casino, to the illegal and crim-
inal casino, and the large-scale, condoned lux-
ury casinos. Also, the exploitation structure is
somewhat obscure. There are adventurers and
smart catering-entrepreneurs. However, after a
while the exploitation of Golden Ten is ruled by
only a few specialized entrepreneurs, who un-
doubtedly know each other, without there be-
ing any direct clues towards criminal or Mafia
practices. The market is shaped like an oligop-
oly; somewhat like the description given by
criminologist Frank Bovenkerk of the Dutch
cannabis production in the nineties.18 They are
insolent executives that own a network of some-
times over ten casinos in the Netherlands or
even Germany, Belgium, or France. The opera-
tors keep a low profile. Because their legal sta-
tus is doubtful they take “precautions” that bor-
der on illegal practices. Their casinos are run by
figureheads and money runners, and at times
they adapt the juridical construction and intro-
duce a list of members to feign a private club.
There have been several incidents that do
point to criminality. This varies from inade-
quate bookkeeping, moonlighting, staff thefts,
and tax evasion, to intimidation and manipu-
lation with roulette dishes, to several hold ups
and the mysterious disappearance of Golden
Ten magnate P.G. Hertel in 1986, who is as-
sumed to be murdered.19 In 1987 Playboy mag-
azine featured a report on the shady profession
of Golden Ten croupier.20 The weekly tabloid
Panorama interviewed an addicted player and
a Golden Ten croupier.21 They both spoke of
strategies, which also came up during my own
interviews, that enable croupiers to put play-
ers at a disadvantage: by manipulating the ball,
the dish, and the playing table; or through so-
called “set-ups” or “deals” between croupiers
and players; and by using psychological tricks
to keep the player in the game and the casino.
However, there are casinos in the realm of
Golden Ten that have expressly detached them-
selves from any criminal activities. For the
training institute for games and service, “OSS
BV,” in particular, Blattgerste does seek to have
a professional management and a proper legal
status. For a short period in 1983 this “insti-
tute” exploited a Golden Ten casino in the Rot-
terdam Hilton—later on there would be a state
casino. In 1986 OSS BV exploited five casinos,
employed 200 people and is said to have paid
over four million Dutch guilders in taxes a year.
A number of the larger Golden Ten operators,
including Blattgerste, initiated a national
Golden Ten foundation, the NSGT, in 1986.
This pressure group aspires a legal status and
government regulation for the trade. Taking
stock of aims and aspirations, this gaming cor-
poration can be compared with the NSC (Dutch
National Foundation for Casino Games, 1971)
and the VAN—a gaming machine trade orga-
nization (also founded in 1971). Such organi-
zations are essential in the strive for legaliza-
tion, on the one hand they (can) keep close
contact with the government and on the other
hand they (can) promote self-regulation in 
the trade. Around 1986 there were about 140
Golden Ten casinos in the Netherlands, mostly
small casinos with no more than two tables but
also ten or so bigger ones that measured up to
the state casinos, in size and set-up.22
The acceptance of Golden Ten is not based
on the Gaming Act but on the questionable up-
holding of the law on the one hand and the so-
cial and administrative recognition of the game
on a local level on the other. These circum-
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stances differ in different areas and change
over time. Every district has its own prosecu-
tion policy and every municipality or even
every casino has its own ideas on the accep-
tance of the game. The market is unstable.
While in Berg en Dal, for instance, Golden Ten
can go about almost unhindered as the admin-
istration feels they do not receive sufficient
backing from the judiciary, the local govern-
ment of the neighboring city Nijmegen is try-
ing to discourage the exploitation of Golden
Ten casinos by means of an entertainment per-
mit (keeping in mind the candidature of this
city for a state casino). At the same time Ros-
malen, 40km west of Nijmegen, treats the pres-
ence of the Golden Ten casinos as an asset in
the municipality. In 1986 in Rosmalen, or the
“Las Vegas of the south” as it was known in
the mid-eighties, the mayor even declared him-
self to support the legalization of bona fide
Golden Ten casinos.
At first, the national government assumed a
resigned position in anticipation of what was
to come. In a prime reaction to the acquittal of
the Golden Ten operator Wiggers, in 1984 the
State Secretary of Economic Affairs, stated that
it is “a misconception that the government will
be tolerant with regard to quasi-roulettes.”23
But it was soon clear that prosecution would
be accompanied by considerable juridical prob-
lems. In June 1986 the responsible members of
government answered to the Lower House by
stating that “to intensify the investigation and
prosecution policy as requested by the Dutch
casino corporation and the Casinos Council
would weigh too heavily on ‘personnel and fi-
nancial means.’” The Procurators-General of
the courts had by then already decided not to
make Golden Ten high priority unless known
criminals are involved.
In 1986 the public prosecutor seriously pros-
ecuted Golden Ten in a number of districts,
mostly in the metropolitan areas in the west of
the Netherlands. To enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of the prosecution the police de-
ploy trained “participant observers.”24 They
observed around 300 hours of gaming behav-
ior to appreciate the factor of chance with
Golden Ten. The public prosecutor also drew
the attention to the economic offenses Golden
Ten exploitation entails with regard to taxes
and social benefits. Operators can be penalized
for these offenses more harshly than by a rul-
ing under the Gaming Act. One of the targets
was the Leijdse Club in Amsterdam owned by
OSS BV.25 After each police raid the club just
reopened. This repeated itself four times in a
row. The staff was highly indignant at the per-
severance of the public prosecutor and offered
a petition to the mayor and aldermen of Ams-
terdam speaking of “capriciousness” and “ar-
bitrariness.”
Thus, Golden Ten was indeed prosecuted in
several places and the public prosecutor by all
means considered it to be a game of chance.
Still, in many cases the public prosecutor re-
signed to the Golden Ten activities, often out
of frustration over lost cases, the heavy burden
of proof, and the running procedures. It was
not until 1990 that justice tightened up the na-
tional prosecution of the game. Under the in-
fluence of the government and the Lower
House, the Procurators-General decided to
augment the priority in the fall of 1989.26 Mean-
time, in the jurisprudence a mitigation of the
burden of proof took shape. The court of Rot-
terdam felt that police observation was no
longer strictly necessary. In reaction to this
Golden Ten clubs closed down in several dis-
tricts. Subsequently the court of law of The
Hague took the same stand in October 1989 and
February 1990. In these court cases the judge
accepted the report by Wagenaar and Keren
from 1985 as sufficient evidence that Golden
Ten was indeed a game of chance. In this light
the public prosecutor conducted an all-out of-
fensive on the Golden Ten casinos in the south-
ern provinces of the Netherlands.
The Dutch casino corporation and the Casi-
nos Council during the eighties were most
strong in their lobby for the suppression of
Golden Ten. With the public prosecutor, with
the Ministries of Justice and Economic affairs,
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in politics, in annual reports, and in the media
they continuously emphasized the dangers of
illegality. They also protested a policy of toler-
ance with regard to quasi-roulettes and insisted
strongly that Golden Ten be rigidly prosecuted.
The Dutch casino corporation and the Casinos
Council referred to it as “fraudulent competi-
tion.”
In fact, the Casinos Council was actively in-
volved in the actions against Golden Ten casi-
nos. Journalists of the weekly tabloid Elsevier
questioned this development.27 The Casinos
Council drew up inventories of Golden Ten
casinos, had talks with the public prosecutor
about the prosecution, and is said to have mis-
lead prominent Golden Ten operators to get
them to collaborate with a test case. Blattgerste
feared: “This is not fair play, we cannot face up
to this lobby.” The Casinos Council later com-
missioned criminal law specialist T. Schalken
to draw up a report28 on all possible options to
prevent and shut down illegal casinos. Even-
tually, the aforementioned report on chance
and skill with Golden Ten by Wagenaar and
Keren,29 also commissioned by the Casinos
Council, appeared to be essential. This report
ended with the—for the legal casino industry—
perturbing conclusion that the furnishing of
proof would be very hard, so long as the judge
did not condemn Golden Ten as such.
Besides the element of chance there is an-
other argument for the prosecution of Golden
Ten. The adversaries also have called upon the
danger of addiction, and claim that this is
greater in these casinos than it is in the state
casinos. Schalken, for instance, feels that the
tackling of the “most negative effects of (ex-
cessive) gaming” should be the government’s
first aim. Then, from this “priorities can be es-
tablished to trace and prosecute illegal casi-
nos.”30
The rise of Golden Ten in the mid-eighties
served as a threat to the Dutch casino corpora-
tion as it was just then that this corporation was
planning to expand on the number of casinos
and preparing the introduction of slot ma-
chines. In addition, the returns of the state casi-
nos fell back 14 percent over the course of 1985.
Consequently, the corporation designed “pol-
icy strategies, after deliberation with the gov-
ernment (. . .) to withstand the competition of
the illegal gambling houses.” This is what, in
1986, the board communicated to the staff in an
elaborate circular.31 The proposals were aimed
at the “popularization” of casino visits and im-
plicated a change of image for the state casinos
in the fashion of the Golden Ten casinos. The
board meant to liberalize the identification re-
quirements and dress code, review the open-
ing hours of the slot machines department,
abolish advertising limitations, tailor the gam-
ing offer to the “small-time player,” and en-
force a “liberation” of the casino corporation to
be able to pursue decisive policies.
However, the swerve in market strategy of
the state casinos cannot be exclusively ascribed
to the competition with Golden Ten. More
likely it was a mutual process. The expansion
and popularization of the state casinos and 
the rise of Golden Ten reinforced each other
and came about from the same opportune cir-
cumstances. This way, Golden Ten may well be
an image of the future of the legal casino trade.
While the Dutch casino corporation set out 
a new course on the market, the NSGT ogled
the law.32 All throughout the palmy days of
Golden Ten operators found themselves forced
to turn away from the criminal elements on the
market and to foil imputations of crime from
the sidelines. This was already so when
Blattgerste, in 1984, sued the newspaper Alge-
meen Dagblad for publishing an article in which
one of the members of the board of the Dutch
casino corporation declared that he heard that
West-German criminals and Dutch drug smug-
glers joined together to exploit Golden Ten. Im-
putations like this were still a main concern
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when the NSGT issued the memorandum,
Golden Ten In Perspective,33 in reaction to the
government memorandum, Gaming In Perspec-
tive.34 The NSGT estimated that the game re-
turns of Golden Ten over 1988 added up to an
amount between 310 and 440 million Dutch
guilders (for the state casinos they were 225
million (SK)).35 The NSGT mostly protested the
way that Golden Ten is associated with crimi-
nality. The government point-blank ranked
Golden Ten as an illegal game. What the gov-
ernment raised as the most important objection
against Golden Ten, the NSGT found “incor-
rect and simplistic,” namely that the operators:
( . . . ) do not keep to their legal obliga-
tions with regard to social security and
taxes as well as tread the regulations for a
reliable and responsible game offer, while
at the same time there are no provisions
to keep any control over the negative ef-
fects of gaming.36
The NSGT claimed that the government
wrongly generalized all Golden Ten casinos.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have used the case of Golden
Ten in the eighties to illustrate the transitional
phase, characteristic for the alibi model of the
1964 Gaming Act, between on the one hand the
prohibition of casinos and on the other hand
the spread of casinos. The expansion of the
Golden Ten market was answered by actions
against the Golden Ten casinos and a growing
number of state casinos. Illegal casinos were re-
placed by legal ones, or so it seems. My point
here is that this assertion is only true in retro-
spect and is more or less performed (as in a
play). It may just as well be posed that the
choice for state casinos made Golden Ten casi-
nos illegal. Finally I would like to examine how
the notion of a “liminal” transitional phase can
lead to a positive definition of the shady and
controversial status of Golden Ten, without
ranking the game outside the social order by
labeling it illegal and criminal in advance.
First, the difference between legality and il-
legality is no unambiguous and distinct di-
chotomy, but a continuum with options for 
various extreme positions and changing possi-
bilities. With Golden Ten I have not so much
focused on the legal and illegal activities but all
the more on the strategies of the operators who
not only strived to broach a lucrative market
but also thought they could obtain a legal sta-
tus for the game. In the context of the 1964 Gam-
ing Act they were not unreasonable notions. In
this regime games of chance could obtain a le-
gal status if their social importance could be
demonstrated, and this importance could go as
far as existing only in the evident market of
players. In fact, between the fifties and nineties,
the legislature mainly legalized gaming to meet
the illegal markets. However, this did not hap-
pen without a concrete occasion and clear con-
ditions. The fact that the government in 1974 le-
galized the casinos on a modest scale and under
very restrictive conditions implicated an artifi-
cial scarcity of casinos. This scarcity made the
market lucrative for entrepreneurs without a li-
cense and at the same time vulnerable to crim-
inality as government control over illegal casi-
nos is by definition difficult.
Second, in this light the legalization of a num-
ber of casinos during the seventies did not so
much mark the end of illegality but the begin-
ning of a transitional phase where the illegal par-
allel markets existed next to the state casinos.
This resulted in a transitional market situation
requiring a specific concept for description and
analysis. Because of its great variety and con-
troversial character the casino market became
much like a circuit, like the one I described ear-
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lier with regard to bingo.37 Such a circuit dis-
tinguishes itself from an informal subculture as
well as from a regulated economic sector. Social
(livingroom) casinos as well as criminal under-
ground casinos, condoned casinos, and re-
spectable legal casinos are all part of the casino
circuit. A differentiated circuit arises when dif-
ferent parties become involved with the ex-
ploitation of the game. Different parties can be
game operators, catering parties, police, justice,
various types of players, policy makers, and leg-
islators. They influence the exploitation causing
the practice of the game to gradually change.
According to the “actor-network theory,” de-
veloped by Latour,38 among others, to enhance
the study of science and technology, the diffu-
sion of a game always goes together with the
“translation” of the game into the terms of the
parties that get involved. From this perspective
a light can be shed on how a game variant gets
entangled with the broader social order; the
variant can only exist if and for the time that the
game is support by their harboring networks.
Third, important for Golden Ten is that the
policy made a distinction between variants of
illegal exploitation that were to be tolerated and
other variants that should be tackled. In a way
this distinction presented game exploitation
with a new norm, because now not every ille-
gal operator was treated as a criminal. The dis-
tinction between criminality and illegality,
made not only by police and justice but also 
by the operators, furthered the purging of the
game exploitation. Deceit and violence were
pushed back, social acceptance of a game was
reason for considerable leniency, and at the
same time some (implicit) government control
was implemented. The exploitation of Golden
Ten in this light was considered to be a so-called
‘victimless crime”.39 The gaming practice here-
with approached the ratio of the law. The vic-
timless crime viewpoint can lead to a permis-
sive state or even legalization of the game.
Fourthly, with the “juridification” of Golden
Ten the discussion turned more to the issue of
skill. An essential part of this was, as became
clear earlier, science. Operators, the public pros-
ecutor, police, and judges engage expert wit-
nesses, quote from their reports and avail of sci-
entific arguments and methods to either prove
or deny the skill level of the game. The under-
lying thought seems to be that scientific meth-
ods and theories can enhance juridical argu-
ments and thus contribute to a “better,” that is,
more independent and objective administration
of law. But is that how it works? In 1983 a judge
acquitted a Golden Ten operator on the basis of
a scientific report presented by the defense. The
prosecution was not able to counter this with any
other scientific data. In this case justice was made
dependent of science. Some six years later the
judge convicted the game of Golden Ten on ac-
count of another report. Between 1983 and 1989
the judiciary adjusted her standards, partly pres-
sured to it by politics and the state casino busi-
ness. It seems that not so much were the reports
decisive in this matter but they altered interpre-
tation of the law. During this period police and
justice practiced a little science of their own in
the averment against Golden Ten. The judge ac-
cepted the observation reports by the police.
Here, science was made dependent of justice.
It seems to be a paradoxical process. While
science is called upon to enhance juridical ar-
guments, the judiciary is undermining its cred-
ibility. This indicates the precarious position of
science in court, as Sheila Jasanoff elaborately
demonstrates in Science at the Bar.40 Scientific
methods and theories depend on the situation
and often have only limited validity. If there
are no experts or sufficient scientific analyses
the judge may reject the charges (no matter
how obvious the case may be). This lesson the
public prosecutor learned in the early eighties
during the actions against Golden Ten. After
this, police and justice would venture out them-
selves to produce scientific evidence (even
though the data could hardly pass as scientific).
In the case around Golden Ten my conclusion
is not that the judiciary has incorrectly or ran-
domly made use of science but that an inter-
play existed between the rituals of justice and
science that was part of and contributed to the
ambivalent, liminal status of Golden Ten.
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